Maori Analysis - Crothers Theoritical Models explaining Maori Failure / Success (Part 2)

Crothers Description of Models for Theorising Māori disparities and/ or achievements

Excerpts taken from "Wellbeing and Disparity in Tamakimakaurau" report 2.

Click here for all the research reports:

http://www.auckland.ac.nz/uoa/well-being-and-disparity-in-tamaki-makaurau-1

Click here for pdf of the Crothers report 

http://www.auckland.ac.nz/webdav/site/central/shared/about/maori-at-auckland/documents/Wellbeing%20and%20disparity%20Vol%202.pdf

Theoritical Models

The Age Difference model: 

The age structure (and other differences between Māori and non-Māori) places extra impediments on Māori levels of achievement.
• Background: there are several (relatively innocuous or even subtle) ways in which Māori and non-Māori populations differ The more obvious of these is that Māori, because of a higher rate of natural increase, have a “younger population” with a lower mean age. As a result Māori have a greater concentration of certain
components (e.g. younger children, teenagers) and a paucity in other components (e.g. older people): were these differential components to be “controlled for” Māori /non-Māori differences would reduce, if not disappear. Alternatively, it might be shown that certain social phenomena particularly arise because of the
combined effect of the differential components: for example, the “control structure” in Māori communities might be affected by larger numbers to be controlled, but fewer to control.
• Underpinnings: the theoretical assumptions need only be straight “demography”.
• Issues: what characteristics need to be considered other than age structure and its more obvious implications (e.g. household size)?
• Measurement: the differential age structure (or other difference) should be controlled for statistically.
• Policy implication: while such differences are obdurate in the short term, in the long term they might fade away. One policy implication might be to implement population policy (e.g. encourage limiting births) to try to even out demographic differences.

The Class model: 

Much of the lack of achievement of many Māori is also shared by the New Zealand working class more generally.
• Background: in the world literature a major theme is the way in which minority groups are also often limited (even ghettoised) at the bottom of the social structure, and that many of their difficulties are shared by others in the working class (or even lumpen-proletariat). Minority groups are often more lowly placed in the class structure, as they are more recent “immigrants” without the education, “cultural capital” or accumulated economic capital to readily break into the processes of capital production.
• Underpinnings: this theoretical approach may be (but is not necessarily) Marxian in tone.
• Issues: which particular aspect of class is more pertinent (e.g. education, income, assets…) and also does the effect of class precede or is it subsequent to the effect of ethnicity?
• Measurement: ethnicity should be “controlled” by measures of class and only the residual attributed to ethnicity.
• Policy implication: long-term strategies are necessary to build up the ability of Māori to engage successfully in the Pākehā class system.

The Capitalist/Structural model: 

Māori have insufficient access to the main structural levers of collective achievement (e.g. economic capital) and more generally the intergenerational mobility processes of Māori do not work as well.
Background/Underpinnings: this is a more solidly Marxian version of the class model. One argument is that “invisible ceilings” inhibit Māori advancement above a certain point.
• Measurement: the key measure is the extent to which capital is owned/controlled by stakeholders within Māoridom and requires a group analysis.
• Policy implication: that Māori need more access to capital to participate in the central processes of capitalism.

The Discrimination model: 

Māori are seriously discriminated against by non-Māori who retain control over gatekeeping (access to societal resources).
• Background: clearly there are elements of racism within New Zealand society and these attitudes may be actively (or more passively) directed against Māori by  those with decision making roles in the hiring of staff, choice of tenants for houses and so on.
• Underpinnings: quite a large literature on “gatekeepers” emerged in the leftWeberian literature in race relations and urban studies from the 1960s on and has led to a variety of empirical studies that have validated this viewpoint.
• Issues: on the other hand, there is some “reverse discrimination” propelled by “affirmative action” programmes which differentially favour Māori.
• Measurement: it may be possible to measure (directly or indirectly) people’s (and especially gatekeepers’) attitudes and (better still) their behaviour, so that discrimination can be revealed. However, over time the growing cultural prescriptions on racist discourse (i.e. “political correctness”) have meant that racist attitudes are more difficult to measure as they are more often (at least partially) suppressed.
• Policy implication: education of gatekeepers and also ensuring that gatekeepers are sufficiently sensitive to issues of racism.

The “Culture of Poverty” model: 

Many Māori (and others) have taken up (more or less actively) a culture that is resistant to capitalism.
• Background: it is clear that capitalism generates (at least partial) opposition and resistance from some groups, especially its victims, and the cultural values held by such groups may inhibit their extent of success in advancement. For example, working class people may prefer a “socialist” or a “cooperative” solution, or wish to directly and actively sabotage capitalist production in their workplace, or prefer to “retreat” into some cultural haven.
• Underpinnings: this approach largely stems from a “subculture” viewpoint.
• Measurement: Although capitalist-resistant attitudes may not always be easy to measure, some differences may be reasonably clearly demarcated.
• Policy implication: either those holding counter-cultural values need to be supported in achieving through non-capitalist routes, or they need “re-education”.

The “Cultural Deficit” model: 

Māori culture has values that inhibit achievement.
• Background: this is a more culture-specific version of the “culture of poverty” model, in which Māori attitudes are seen as more directly stemming from cultural values, rather than as a more diffuse reaction to their social situation.
Underpinnings: perhaps this view can be traced back to a holistic anthropological model which emphasizes cultural specificity and uniqueness.
• Measurement: group analysis would be required, although analysis of the extent to which individual attitudes of Māori seem tightly derived from cultural values may be possible.
• Policy implication: as for “culture of poverty” model.

The “Pākehā Capital” argument: 

Organizations in New Zealand have such a Pākehā flavour that they do not work as well for Māori.
• Background: sometimes Māori have difficulties, varying from minor to major, in dealing with established institutions, which seems to flow from a Pākehā style of operation.
• Underpinnings: this model would be an application of Bourdieu’s class-based arguments that social stratification often works in a way set by dominating interests and rewards those who share styles similar to those of the dominant group.
• Measurement: studies of “provider-provided” interactions would be required to pin down the ways in which difficulties seem to arise.
• Policy implication: setting up either Māori “providers” or organizations with more distinctly “Māori” user-friendliness.

The “Contextual” model: 

Māori in some geographical (or community) situations face extra impediments than those in other geographical (or community) situations.
• Background: it seems some portion of the Māori population have achieved a reasonable position in the New Zealand social order, but that particular “pockets” remain, for example in some rural areas, although such “pockets” need not be spatially defined.
• Underpinnings: concern with spatial contexts at least comes out of developments in geography and in the general notion that capitalism is not one solid system but often operates in modulations or waves.
• Issues: which contexts are those that most limit or advance Māori interests?
• Measurement: access to large-scale, largely quantitative datasets are required.
• Policy implication: targeted assistance to particular localities or groups.

The “Social Deficit” model: 

Involvement in Māori social organizations/activities drains energy and resources better devoted to achievement.
• Background: there is some evidence that involvement in Māori culture and social activities is draining of energy, time and resources which might otherwise be devoted to advancement; for example, Māori work or school absenteeism to attend hui may undermine their achievements in several ways.
• Underpinnings: this is a version of the “cultural deficit” model.
• Issues: what is the trade-off preferred by Māori against the observance of Māori cultural values?
• Measurement: trade-off measures may be required which contrast the gains of observance against its costs.
Policy implication: Māori observances of their culture might be encouraged or discouraged.

The “Social Empowerment” model: 

Involvement in Māori organizations/activities generates fresh energy and resources for achievement.
• Background: clearly, many Māori gain confidence from their involvement in
Māori activities and this may spin off positively into other achievements.
• Underpinnings: this is the flip-side of the deficit model.
• Measurement: those who have gained “Māori capital” might be contrasted with
those who haven’t.
• Policy implication: encouragement of involvement in Māori observances.

Maori Analysis - Crothers Theoritical Models explaining Maori Failure / Success (Part 1)

Crothers Description of Models for Theorising Māori disparities and/ or achievements

Excerpts taken from "Wellbeing and Disparity in Tamakimakaurau" report 2.

Click here for all the research reports:

http://www.auckland.ac.nz/uoa/well-being-and-disparity-in-tamaki-makaurau-1

Click here for pdf of the Crothers report 

http://www.auckland.ac.nz/webdav/site/central/shared/about/maori-at-auckland/documents/Wellbeing%20and%20disparity%20Vol%202.pdf

Introduction

It is important that any major study be in some major part theory-driven, while of course open to being guided by the way the empirical data turn out.

Each model should identify a single (and for current purposes simple) “causal mechanism” which
portrays why a particular social phenomenon is likely to arise.

Theoretical models can guide the search for appropriate data, where appropriate means apposite in testing the implications of each.

Theoretical models may also be useful in indicating possible policy implications: if a theoretical model proves to be empirically useful it may indicate policy levers that need to be invoked to ensure change.

Above all, theoretical models should provide short summative ways of thinking about the subject matter, which sharpen an analyst’s thinking.

There are several caveats about the models produced here.

It is by no means clear that the full range of applicable models have been identified: hopefully other candidates might emerge in reaction to this study. None is assumed to be true merely because they are listed here; any and all require empirical verification.

Baldly stated, some may be morally offensive, but this is not intended since, if nothing else, empirical refutation of repugnant views might be useful.

Another caveat is that it is almost entirely likely that a range of several models would need to be pressed into service to explain some phenomena: it is unlikely that social explanations are ever mono-causal. Further questions arise, if it seems apposite to suggest that several models are in operation, about how exactly each might combine to provide the joint causation: for example, the processes suggested by models might be additive or multiplicative.

A final caveat is that the causation implied at the centre of each model is not necessarily assumed to operate uniformly at all times and overall in all places, but may rather be invoked differentially in relation to particular contexts or particular subpopulations.

Where do different models come from?

In the end, positing models is (as Popper suggested) a creative activity. However, many can be derived from the existing literature on social inequalities. In fact, the burden of proof of many of the models suggested here rests on their success in a myriad of studies as summarized in the research literature on Māori.
....

Equity in life chances: the dependent variable

It is important to be very clear about what the key dependent variable is. (In addition, we should take heed of Robert K. Merton’s advice that the phenomenon to be explained must be “established” empirically, before launching into major explanatory exercises, lest we tilt at windmills.)

The concern of this study can be presented in a variety of quite colloquial ways:

• do Māori (as opposed to non-Māori) get a good deal, or as good a deal in New Zealand? 
• Are any disparities “socially just”? 

One, more technical, vocabulary is to talk in terms of “life-chances”, especially objective life-chances, such as life expectancy. Is the (objective and/or subjective) quality of life of Māori worse than that of non-Māori?

It may be useful to define the two key terms here:

• equity involves seeking to attain equal outcomes according to equal need (and thus equality of access to services and processes of empowerment). 
• Equality is the tougher criterion of exactly equal treatment.

There are two main general models of quality of life that are pertinent: we can contrast models which posit equality of outcome from those suggesting we should aim at equality of process. The former is a tougher stance demanding that everyone (irrespective of personal qualities or talents) should achieve the same level of success.

The latter holds rather that existing conditions should not get worse, or even that poorer initial conditions should be compensated for. This places the emphasis on the fairness of the process. However, the trade-off for this more limiting stance is that it tends to underemphasize the (possible) need for structural reform – in order to “level the playing field”.

A major issue in assessing the quality of life is whether the same goals (or goalposts to continue the “game” metaphor) should be assumed for each grouping within a society. Are Māori goals similar to those of non-Māori? This is a matter needing empirical investigation, as well as requiring considerable theoretical reflection. (This empirical question will be tackled in another section.) In the meantime it will be assumed that Māori and non-Māori have similar levels of aspiration, at least in terms of economic/material matters.

A final point is the extent to which these models are Māori-specific. This author’s general position is that although these models particularly target a Māori situation, in fact, it would be possible to substitute the name of any other “minority group” and achieve the same sort of explanatory power, while missing many nuances.

Some models 

• The Age Difference model: The age structure (and other differences between Māori and non-Māori) places extra impediments on Māori levels of achievement.
• The Class model: much of the lack of achievement of many Māori is also shared by the New Zealand working class generally.
• The “Recent Migrant” model: Māori have only been in cities a couple of generations, but will catch up with the mainstream in time.
• The Capitalist/Structural model: Māori have insufficient access to the main structural levers of collective achievement (e.g. economic capital) and more generally the intergenerational mobility processes of Māori don’t work as well.
• The Discrimination model: Māori are seriously discriminated against by nonMāori who retain control over gatekeeping (access to societal resources).
• The “Culture of Poverty” model: many Māori (and others) have taken up a “culture” or lifestyle which is more or less actively resistant to capitalism.
• The “Cultural Deficit” model: Māori culture has values that inhibit achievement.
• The “Pākehā Capital” argument: organizations in New Zealand have such a Pākehā flavour that they do not work as well for Māori.
• The “Contextual” model: Māori in some geographical (or community) situations face extra impediments than those in other geographical (or community) situations.
• The “Social Deficit” model: involvement in Māori social organizations/activities drains energy and resources better devoted to achievement.
• The “Social Empowerment” model: involvement in Māori organizations/activities generates fresh energy and resources for achievement.

[Atawhai's notes: What about a Maori empowerment model? What about a Culture of Success model?Why is culture the reason for failure? What about those Maori who do well and are culturally strong?]

2.3.4 Ordering/types of models
Reflection on the above list may yield useful insights about the interrelationships between the models and perhaps indicate what further models might be generated in the future:

• The list begins with several “structural” models that seek to explain differences in terms of the differential placement of different groupings within the social structure. The most straightforward of these is important but not very dramatic, whereas the last of the three listed suggests major forces might be involved in
keeping groupings apart.

• The next set of models is essentially “cultural”, holding that the different world views and/or values of different groups are important in affecting their level of  material success.

• Another model focuses on differential effects: there may be particular differences, which arise in particular situations which helps explain Māori/non-Māori differences.

• The last two models listed are an oppositional pair: each suggests opposing ideas about the effects of greater (Māori) involvement in Māori culture.

Maori Identity - Excerpts From Ways of Being Maori by Charles Crothers

A sociographic perspective: “Some Ways of being Māori”

Ka kohi te toi, ka whai te maramatanga.
If knowledge is gathered, enlightenment will follow.

(Cited by T. Moeke-Pickering, 1996.) 

“Far from being members of a homogeneous group, Māori individuals have a variety of cultural characteristics and live in a number of cultural and socioeconomic realities. The relevance of traditional values is not the same for all Māori, nor can it be assumed that all Māori will wish to define their ethnic
identity according to classical constructs. At the same time, they will describe themselves as Māori and will reject any notion that they are ‘less Māori’ than those who conform to a conventional image” 

(Durie, 1995: 465). 

Abstract 

This study attempts to mine relevant material on differences between Māori and nonMāori, and differences within Māori (and to some extent within non-Māori), from “official social book-keeping sources” and surveys. In particular, I endeavour to establish the extent to which non-Māori, sole/mixed Māori and ethnic/descent Māori differ in terms of social background characteristics and their reported behaviour and attitudes.

One part of the study focuses on variability in people’s Māoriness, on identity, and the range of activities and occasions in which people may (or may not) feel Māori. This includes the extent to which (essentially) non-Māori choose to support or even to participate in Māori activities.

Click here for the whole report: 

http://www.auckland.ac.nz/webdav/site/central/shared/about/maori-at-auckland/documents/Wellbeing%20and%20disparity%20Vol%202.pdf

1.1 Objectives 

This study aims to contribute to the understanding of the nature of disparities between Māori and non-Māori, and among Māori in major urban areas specifically within Auckland, and to suggest the formulation of evidence-based policies to assist Māori to overcome those disparities they individually or collectively find undesirable.

In order to study urban Māori disparities, several questions must be separately and jointly addressed:

• What are the historical, demographic and settlement contexts of Māori?
• What are the goals/values/aspirations of Māori?
• What have been Māori achievements/underachievements?
• How do Māori distribute their attention among different domains?
• In each of several life-domains, how well have Māori managed?
• What are the collectivities through which Māori live their lives?
• What government (and other) services/interventions affect Māori, and how are Māori affected?
• What policy implications flow from the needs of Māori and the attempted interventions to meet these needs?

For each of these questions this report is concerned with comparing:
• the differences between Māori and non-Māori;
• the range within Māoridom;
and especially –
• the differences between urban Māori and non-urban Māori;
• the differences between Auckland-domiciled Māori and those in other urban
areas; and
• the differences among Māori domiciled in different areas of Auckland.

Challenges with Maori v Non-Maori analyses

Māori /non-Māori averages have been compared using objective data across a broad array of arenas – and without much attempt at overall summation, except for some particular attention to income and
employment. Differences are interpreted in very broad cultural terms (although the Western value-set is taken as the norm).

Reaction to th[e] “closing the gaps” approach [between Māori /non-Māori]  (e.g. Chapple 2000a; Gould 2000) has extended the approach by suggesting (inter alia) that:

• there are often difficulties with the data (especially that based on official social book-keeping statistics);
• while absolute differences continue in many arenas relative differences are reducing;
• dispersions are as important as averages (and that the very overlap of Māori /nonMāori dampens the differences);
• Māori (and perhaps non-Māori) include a range of ethnic orientations;
• factors other than race (partially) explain Māori /non-Māori differences, e.g. education, social class, cultural/social capital etc (and consequently multivariate data analyses are required to capture these effects);
• there may be pockets where differences are concentrated (e.g. rural locations); and
• “culturally appropriate” programme delivery is seldom appropriate.

In more detail, Chapple asserts that (in quick summary: I have placed the immediate rebuttal of these points in brackets following):

• post 1970 Māori are better off (but a partial recent recovery follows more recently difficult times for many Māori);
• being Māori is a recent (post-1945) invention (but in fact there has been a long history of pan-tribal involvements);
• Māori is a declining construct (but this is based on misleading 1996 Census results);
• through intermarriage, the “Māoriness” of the New Zealand population is declining, although – on the other hand – because of this intermarriage, the possibility for more Māori is increased: intermarriage leads to a more widespread “browning” of the New Zealand population (so the phenomenon is complex);
• since a high proportion of Māori vote on the general roll, there is low participation in Māori politics (but Labour encouraged enrolment on the general roll and the focus of Māori effort has varied over time);
• the more successful Māori tend to choose to emphasise their Pākehā connections (but there is as much evidence to the contrary);
• the Māori ethnic revival is driven by “ethnic entrepreneurs” (who presumably enjoy benefits of this “capture”: but they receive widespread support);
• Māori and Pākehā have different “tastes” (e.g. for leisure and producing nonmarket goods: but evidence for this is not readily available);
• Māori in Australia also do poorly (but Australia is also racist in relation to indigenous groups).

Along somewhat similar lines, Gould argues that:
• different measures of change are required (but, this is a complex methodological concern);
• the concept of Māori ancestry is irrelevant for policy (and also statistical) purposes (but, the evidence is more complex than this);
• socio-economic differences within the Māori population are as great as Mäori/nonMāori differences (nevertheless, Māori have distinctive social features);
• “degree of Mäoriness” (e.g. through intermarriage) determines socio-economic success (but the evidence is more complex than this);
• modernisation is more appropriate than cultural maintenance as a goal for Māori (a value judgment).

However, much of their argumentation in this “revisionist” approach is limited theoretically (especially as it is framed in economic terms and couched at an individual level) and is poorly based on data. As a result there has been considerable contestation of their work (e.g. Alexander 2001; Portal Consulting 2001; Rochford 2001).

A plethora of criticisms has been advanced including points such as:

• Pool’s argument that absolute differences are better measures of change than ratios which may be based on unstable denominators;
• Armstrong’s concern that Chapple’s “forthcoming” papers are still coming, his documentation of data is poor, and he as a civil servant has unfair access to statistics;
• Rochford’s concern that Chapple’s data exclude the low income earners (because unemployed) and also high earners (as a “cut-off”) (Rochford, 2001: 5);
• Rochford’s alternative explanations that any convergences are more a result of increasing employment, and therefore cyclical rather than secular as claimed, and that in fact Chapple’s charts show “recovery” to the smaller gaps of early dates is yet to happen; and that similarly;
• since the education gap has been steady over time it cannot be driving any changes in disparities (Rochford 2001);
• the difficulty in drawing too strong conclusions (in the face of marked colinearity) from use of proportion of variance explained and also the causal ordering revealed by step-wise regression equations (Alexander and Williams 2001).

In sum, the reaction to the Chapple-Gould argumentation has taken one of three forms:
• criticism of particular analyses;
• criticism of the more general framework within which their argument sits;
• attempts to move the debate into wider territory.

......

Social research of a more quantitative type has hardly ignored ethnicities. Indeed, there is a widespread tendency in New Zealand social research for the Māori / non Māori categorisations to be routinely deployed as standard comparisons in data analysis.

As Pool et al. wryly note,

“Finally comparisons between Māori and nonMāori have been made … Indeed, in most social research in New Zealand this is the typical comparison that is made” (1999: 130). 

They go on to suggest wider perspectives can also be adopted:

“Yet in many ways the differences between these two ethnic groups are far less important than those between New Zealand and … other low fertility countries”. 

For example, they suggest that there is a reasonable Māori/North American fit in terms of patterns of contraception and sterilization. However, such a comparative viewpoint is not pursued here.

Moreover, merely reporting ethnic correlations is unduly simplistic, since the comparisons are seldom entirely valid. Multivariate analyses are required to sift out some of the complexity. Another typical move in research has been to oversimplistically publish “league tables” of success (e.g. of schools in achieving good results in school examinations). As Harker and Nash (1998) point out, there is a need
for “value-added analysis” since league tables do not reward the good performance of some schools of turning poorer-quality recruits into better-than-expected outcomes.

A methodological issue which then arises is how the “residual” variance is best explained: this might be understood as “luck” or “differential opportunity” or else assigned to diffuse “structural” or “cultural” factors. Any such approach must be recognised as being arbitrary.

A major issue is how ethnicity should be handled. It is assumed in line with current “best practice” that ethnicity is by self-definition. However, in the course of data collection and analysis self-definitions are often limited through collapsing categories. For example, the terms “Sole Māori” or “Mixed Māori” used throughout this report, are terms imposed by analysts rather than by the participants.

Maori identity

A of Māori research (also going back to the work of the Ritchies) has been on the conceptualization of Māori identity (for a broad review see Kukutai, 2001).

Metge (1995) summarizes some decades of her own work, in some pithy statements:

Taken collectively, te iwi Māori is characterized by a combination of 
characteristics: genealogical descent from the pre-European inhabitants of 
New Zealand, distinctive physical features, distinctive values and ways of 
organising social life, shared history, and consciousness of kind (“a we 
feeling”). Those who identify themselves and are identified by others as Māori 
do not necessarily display all these characteristics in their own person (1995: 
18). 

While demographers, social scientists and the general public continue to 
debate the definition of “a Māori”, the Māori determine the issue in their own 
way. They specify descent from a Māori parent or ancestor as the basic 
requirement, and, provided that is fulfilled, accept as Māori those who identify 
themselves as Māori. Attempts to impose a narrower definition in terms of 
linguistic or cultural competence are generally rejected (1995: 18). 

A far more quantitative approach has been taken by David Thomas (1988) who reports the development and implementation of a 40-item questionnaire that assesses knowledge of Māori language and cultural practice. When administered to samples of school children and university students, the test had satisfactory item-total correlations, internal consistency and also differentiated among ethnic Māori and ethnic Pākehā.

In an earlier study (1986), Thomas found that Māori children with some knowledge of Māori language and culture have higher scores on achievement tests than Māori children who have little or no knowledge of Māori culture.

In a later study (Thomas and Nikora 1996), it was found that Pākehā people see ethnic differences as consisting primarily of differences in physical appearance, whereas Māori students’ conceptions of being Māori emphasized culture and language.

Very recently, Broughton et al. (2000) reviewed the conceptualization of identity and found broad support for the notion that ethnic identification is associated with higher levels of cultural involvement. But, they found little hardcore involvement in Māori culture, perhaps because the age group they studied is seduced by youth culture (2000: 28). They claimed the implications are that:

…because of the high variation in ethnic identification and participation 
among those classified as Māori there is a need for a parallel variability in 
service provision with services for young Māori spanning a range of options 
that include both mainstream and Māori community based services (2000: 29). 

Gibson found that how women saw themselves was rarely congruent with how they were perceived by others (cited by Kukutai, 2001: 60).